This paper deals with income redistribution and scal e ects caused by immigration in a two-sector economy with xed capital endowments. We consider immigration under political control into one sector only, guided by the stylized fact that empirical immigration distributions often appear highly unequal. A distinguishing feature of the present model are changing relative goodprices which are ruled out in related single sector models but typically also in open economy type of models. Thus even pure wage earners may win from immigration. The political support for immigration therefore crucially depends on relative sector size. Furthermore the necessary tax-rate to nance the transfer system may decrease as result of immigration. We also demonstrate that decreasing relative productivity of the open sector is accompanied by decreasing support for immigration.
Introduction
Immigration is amongst the most sensible political issues in many countries these days. In the US it is immigration from Mexico, in western Europe immigration streams originate in eastern Europe and Africa while immigration related to Asian countries is more diverse but by no means less important see OECD 1997 . In many western countries immigration contributes signi cantly to population growth and accounts for many di erent non-economic e ects. Thus when analyzing the economic e ects of immigration one has to take into account that only a part of all immigrants enter the labor force. In many cases family reuni cation dominates and labor markets are a ected only indirectly. We will concentrate exclusively on labor migration, which might change the production process and distribution in several ways. First an increase of the supply of production factors enhances production possibilities or even per capita output in the presence of increasing returns to scale. 1 Secondly labor migration changes the proportion in which production factors are supplied and under some conditions this is accompanied by income redistribution. And thirdly immigration can cause scal e ects. In the political debate the last two points dominates. An overview of how these topics are treated in economic theory and on relevant empirical data can befound in Borjas 1994 . The present paper, stimulated by Flores 1997, also deals with these two points. Distributional and scal e ects are analyzed in a highly standard framework for a real economy that is closed except for immigration. The implicit assumption here is the existence of an outside world where real wages are lower than at home, so that migration is always welcome from the outside world perspective. But as we consider politically controlled immigration-quotas there is no such thing as real wage equalization across borders. Flores has analyzed these distribution e ects of immigration in a closed one-sector commodity market model. 2 He poses the question under what conditions immigration quotas will be increased in a democratic election process. In his two-factor one-sector model labor will unambiguously loose and capital will win ignoring rst scal e ects, so the capital ownership distribution is decisive for the outcome of this election. But in many countries immigrants are not allocated in a proportional way to the di erent economic sectors. To illustrate this fact we show in Figure 1 below a scatterplot of the relationship between foreign employment share and median income for 27 Austrian business sectors 1995 data. Using median sector income as proxy for sector productivity y ou can verify the stylized fact, that foreign employment is concentrated in low productivity sectors. 3 While this concentration of foreign labor in low productivity sectors may partially re ect lower skill levels of foreign labor, we are convinced that there is more to tell about this 1 The last e ect would be a topic of growth theory, but as our model is based on constant returns to scale there are no such possibilities and thus we will ignore growth issues altogether.
2 With free commodity trade open model redistribution between labor and capital only occurs under special circumstances like more factors than commodities, as shown in Jones 1971. For a more extensive list of conditions see Rivera-Batiz 1983. 3 It should be noted that the data are not adjusted for di erences in working time, which, if taken into account, would further strengthen the argument. phenomenon. An additional explanation in our opinion is active sheltering of certain high wage sectors by political pressure groups through lobbying. This poses the question, what might be gained by restructuring the present immigration quotas, which, by and large are high for low productivity sectors and low for high productivity sectors. This sort of question can not be answered by means of a single-sector model. Thus a better understanding of immigration impacts under such conditions requires at least a two-sector model. Such models were used, although for di erent purposes, for example in Harris and Todaro 1970, or Kubin and Rosner 1996 . They commonly feature a second channel for immigration e ects: Changing relative prices. This channel opens the theoretical possibility for some pure wage earners to win from immigration even in a two-factor-model. But if this occurs the capital ownership distribution will no longer be the only decisive factor regarding politically supported immigration quotas. In our model there exists a transfer system nanced by taxes. Immigration leads to an increasing sum of transfers and thus sum of taxes. Yet it is unclear, whether this also increases the tax rate, which is what matters individually. We will tackle this problem by investigating whether immigration into the low-productivity sector has di erent e ects on taxes than immigration into the high-productivity sector. For a discussion on this point in a somewhat di erent context see Razin and Sadka 1996 , where the tax rate is endogenously determined in the political process. They show for example that increasing immigration into low-wage sectors can, but must not be accompanied by higher tax rates. So, within the limitations of our model, we try to answer the following questions:
How are winners and losers from immigration determined, when immigration is restricted to one sector only? What factors determine the level of the politically supported immigration quota? How does the tax rate respond to di erent productivity ratios between the isolated and the open-to-immigration sector ?
What is the in uence of total factor productivity changes on political support for immigration. to either labor or capital and no rents exist which could become demand relevant. An additional assumption we will employ concerns the elasticities of substitution, labeled s , which relate the relative factor input quantities that rms employ to produce a xed amount of output to relative factor prices. We will assume that a 1 increase in the W s =R s ratio will lead to less than 1 increase in the K s =L s ratio, because we consider the possibilities for short term substitution of labor through capital or vice versa to be limited, that is:
Assumption 1: Little Substitutability: s 1 for s = 1 ; 2: 3 A short overview about the impact of di erent degrees of factor substitutability on relative factor prices in related trade theory models can be found in Engerman and Jones 1997.
Equilibrium Prices
We are considering a real economy here where price levels have no economic meaning. Only price ratios matter. For convenience we will therefore arbitrarily x the price of sector-1-good the numeraire as an anchor for the price system by setting P 1 = 1 . This will allow t o calculate equilibrium price levels for all other goods and factors explicitly.
The demand side of our economy is modeled simply by assuming that a constant share "
with 0 " 1 of total nominal income Y y 1 + P 2 y 2 is directed towards sector one goods. 4 So this economy will be in equilibrium when prices have adjusted such that the total nominal value of production and thus total nominal income multiplied with " is just large enough to buy back all output from sector one or y 1 = " y 1 + P 2 y 2 :
4
Trying to nd an appropriate price index to assess real income changes in this two-good model, a natural candidate with well established theoretical properties under the constant expenditure share assumption appears to be "+ 1 ,"P 2 . But this de nition proves rather tricky in a formal sense and we therefore replace it with a more handsome one as follows:
P I y 1 + P 2 y 2 y 1 + y 2 :
5
The reader may v erify 5 that both de nitions lead to identical results if outputs are measured such that y 1 =y 2 = "=1,". We will assume that this condition is met. Furthermore both indices change by exactly equal amounts as consequence of immigration. But one condition has to be taken care of in applying de nition 5: The demand share " must not change. Otherwise, as output scales are xed, the starting condition for equivalence of the two price indices would beviolated. The de nitions and assumptions above together de ne our preliminary economy a tax system will beadded below, which has a unique market clearing equilibrium described in terms of prices P 1 ; P 2 ; R 1 ; R 2 ; W 1 and W 2 . Explicit solutions of these variables can be found in the Appendix. In classical manner we will assume that excess demand drives prices up and excess supply drives prices down, such that this equilibrium is stable. In the following we will be dealing exclusively with equilibria.
Transfers and Taxes
Like in Flores97 we shall allow lump-sum transfers and proportional taxes in this economy. We assume that these transfers are nanced with a at tax rate t applied to all factor incomes, which yields total nominal tax revenues of tY . Therefore the average real tax per person is tY= P I L 1 +L 2 . But for the public budget to be balanced this average real tax perperson must equal the real transfer perperson. The latter will be labeled and thus the balanced budget condition, which we invoke, must read = tY= P I L 1 +L 2 : Note that has little if any economic meaning itself. But this is not required here, as the main purpose of is to x percapita transfer income in a real, utility level sense in an environment with changing relative prices. 6 To guarantee a tax rate smaller than one make the following This condition is su cient for t 1. Remember that by abstracting from investment issues and thus from savings, all income in this economy i s s p e n t and by market clearing prices this guarantees full employment. Thus the transfers we are facing here are de nitely no unemployment bene ts but should better be thought of as health services or education. This kept in mind condition 7 reads alternatively as a minimum requirement for calling a model economy capitalistic.
Shareholdings
We assume that each dollar in shares pays the average rent across sectors, which we will label R. To illustrate this assumption imagine that the whole capital in this economy belongs to some investment fund. So individuals control this capital only via the shares they hold in this investment fund. The average rent is de ned straightforward as 
Impacts of Immigration into Sector One
Now consider the e ects of immigration, which in the formulation of model 2 means a decreasing capital-labor ratio in sector one, that is dk 1 0. Sector one can be of any relative size in terms of labor or capital or the demand share ". As will beshown, some of our qualitative results will be independent of relative sector sizes, while others wont. We start the analysis of immigration impacts with sector one after tax real wages. Unsurprisingly these will decrease unambiguously as a consequence of immigration. This can beeasily veri ed from equation 37 in the Appendix by setting k i 1 = 0 and deserves no further comment.
Next we turn to the immigration impact on after tax real rental income, that is d 1 , force is the changing tax rate t, the direction of which i s a m biguous see below and which will therefore not be considered separately. But it is possible to establish an unconditional positive net e ect of immigration onto the after tax real rental rate as proven in the Appendix. So for someone earning wage income in sector one and capital income too, the net e ect of immigration is yet unclear and depends on the amount of capital someone owns. We will return to this issue in a moment. But before we will settle the case of sector two employees, which is more clearcut as expressed in the following Proposition 1 Individual sector two real disposable income increases with immigration into sector one, that is @y i 2 =@k 1 0.
So, like in the case of rental income, the direct and positive nominal income e ect in sector two dominates the negative e ect caused by an increasing price level P I and the impact of a changing tax-rate, whatever its direction. Therefore all sector two employees would rationally favor immigration into sector one, whether or not they own any capital and irrespective of relative sector sizes! As mentioned already this result does not depend on whether the equilibrium nominal tax rate t goes up or down as a consequence of immigration. As a matter of fact, it is impossible to tell in general what will happen to this tax rate. Instead we will determine the exact condition for either a decreasing or increasing nominal tax rate t, which is linked to relative labor productivity and size in terms of employment of the two sectors as follows:
Proposition 2 If the immigration sector one is small and has high labor productivity compared with sector two, tax rates go down with immigration, or exactly:
As long as sector two closed for immigration has labor productivity not much smaller were approximated by dividing group wages through 0.75 roughly the labor share in total income. The constant average labor productivity across both groups in the last column serves as reference. The gures in row High Productivity Manufacturing of Table 1 and application of Proposition 2 thus indicate the following: Austria could have lower tax rates as consequence of immigration by increasing the immigration quota for the high productivity group roughly 15 of labor force so de ned and lowering it for the sectors in the other group. But as Figure 1 made rather clear, the Austrian immigration policy did more or less close the high productivity sectors for immigration, while opening the low productivity sectors. We turn back to sector one again. We outlined above that sector one employees need positive amounts of capital to bene t potentially from immigration. But: How much? Answering this question is equivalent with identifying a marginal sector one voter as someone endowed with just enough capital to make him indi erent b e t ween immigration and no-immigration. We shall label this amount of capital as k 1 . With anything more than that a sector one employee would clearly bene t from immigration because this would increase the positive impact depending on k i 1 , while the negative being independent of capital ownership would remain constant. To simplify exposition of the argument, we will assume that this marginal voter will support immigration, that is, we replace indi erence by in-favor-of. Now this critical quantity of capital, identifying the marginal voter is implicitly de ned as dy i 1 k 1 =dk 1 = 0 10 So abstracting from idiosyncratic issues like xenophobia we should expect people employed in sector one and owning k 1 as de ned in 10 or more in capital to vote in favor of immigration into sector one. People endowed with less capital will rationally vote against it.
Further simplifying exposition let's now restrict attention to the following type of capital distribution: Either a person owns nothing, which is true for a proportion of the population, or she owns k O , which is true for a proportion 1 , . which in turn will lower , the potential support for immigration. The necessary change in the tax rate to nance xed individual welfare payments to new immigrants has been discussed above. With the de nition of a pro-immigration vote at hand we n o w turn to a second, somewhat di erent question of the link between changing levels of individual transfer incomes and changing political support for immigration. In the political debate these two questions usually appear in a confused state. The reason is the often encountered assumption that immigration does not only cause the number of transfer income recipients to increase but also the individual transfer income itself. The assumption gets support from the fact, that immigrant distributions are typically biased towards low income groups. On the other hand it must be questioned, whether immigrants in fact qualify for all the sorts of transfer incomes that native borns receive. So let's give an answer to the second question separately:
Proposition 3 If the immigration sector is small and has high labor productivity relative to the other sector, increasing real transfers will increase approval rates to immigration, or exactly: d
It turns out that the direction of response of the pro-vote for immigration to increased real transfers depends on exactly the same condition as that given for changes in the tax rate induced by additional immigration. Therefore, from a political economy point o f view it really is equivalent in the context of this model, to talk about additional immigration or to talk about increasing per capita real transfers. If the former increases nominal taxes, the latter decreases support for immigration and vice versa. But again: The sign of change is dependent on relative sector size and productivity. The nal issue we consider here is the in uence of changing total factor productivity in sector one upon the political support for immigration into sector one.
Proposition 4 If production in sector one is of the sort y 1 = A F 1 K 1 ; L 1 with F 1 : being of the CES-type, then a higher total factor productivity term A will increase approval rates for immigration into sector one. Or formally: @ =@A 0 A higher total factor productivity in the immigration sector increases factor payments to labor and capital. The individual capital endowment necessary to bepositively a ected from immigration therefore decreases with increasing total factor productivity. Note that under the CES-assumption we will not observe any changes of factor proportions with additional immigration. Thus increasing total factor productivity of the open sector will lead to enhanced electoral support for immigration. In the opposite case, which is discussed more often, that is when total factor productivity of the immigration sector deteriorates relativ to sector two, political support will diminish inevitably.
Conclusions
We analyzed a neoclassical two-sector economy, which is closed except for migration. If at all, immigrants enter one sector only with the consequence of a decreasing capital-labor ratio in this sector. Market clearing calls for a change of the factor price ratio. This is one source of the redistribution of personal income. Additionally this model incorporates a transfer system nanced by taxes, which provides another channel for redistribution e ects. We show that the real income of individuals employed in the closed sector will increase under all circumstances. So if the closed sector is large enough, a majority of population will bene t from immigration independent of the distribution of capital ownership. In the immigration sector one matters are not as clear, but pure wage earners will denitely loose. Whether sector-one-employees in general experience increasing real after tax incomes depends crucially on their capital endowments. We can show that beside capital ownership the amount o f p e r capita transfers in uences the potential support for immigration positively if the immigration sector is small and has high labor productivity. In that case immigration will lower the tax rate necessary to nance the given transfer system. An additional determinant for the electorate's decision about additional immigration is the total factor productivity in the immigration sector. If the elasticity of factor substitution is constant the political support for higher immigration quotas will rise with total factor productivity.
If the results of this restricted model are relevant for real world politics, we must say that in many countries it is the present structure of immigration quotas that accounts for much of the political resistance against new immigrants. Immigration into large and low productive sectors hurts more people than alternative immigration ows. Redirection of immigrant ows into more productive sectors will nd more support amongst the electorate. The usual way to analyze income e ects of immigration in the presence of a tax system would be to split up the overall impact into a pure tax e ect working through 1 , t and a real income e ect operating via W s =P I or R=P I . We deliberately refrain from this reasoning and employ instead a distinction between the immigration e ect on the realafter-tax-income-rate 1 , t=P I and nominal income categories, because the tax e ect can be shown to depend crucially on relative sector productivities as will be demonstrated in the proof of Proposition 2. This is the reason for explicitly establishing 31.
Proof of Proposition 1:
We rst split up the derivative under consideration to read dy Now the rst term in large, square brackets on the RHS is de nitely positive and all we have to nd out is the condition for the second term to be negative. But this second term, after some minor manipulations can be shown to be proportional to f 1 L 1 + f 2 L 2 =L 1 + L 2 , 1 f 1 . Using de nition 13 and equilibrium condition 16 it is easily veri ed, that the condition for this to be negative is exactly the one given in the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 4:
First note, that introducing such an e ciency term A by restricting F 1 : to be a CES function, does not change much of the analysis. Neither is the factor share 1 of labor in total sector one income a ected by changes in such a multiplicative e ciency term nor is the substitutability-rate 1 . From the viewpoint of determining the critical capital endowment k 1 only total sector one output y 1 has to beinterpreted a little bit di erent.
To stress this fact we will write e y 1 A instead of y 1 . Ceteris paribus a change in technical e ciency A will simply increase e y 1 without a ecting any other variable that appears in the de nition 38, as we expressed all the rest in terms of factor shares and substitution rates. Therefore the adopted version of 38 reads But the square bracket above is de nitely negative, whereas the factor in front of it is positive because naturally de y 1 =dA e y 0 1 0. So k 1 will decrease with increasing technical e ciency A and this in turn will increase the pro-vote to immigration as claimed.
